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Abstract
Justification logics are explicit versions of modal logics, in which reasons for formulas being so are
part of the formula structure. Justification logics are connected with their corresponding modal
logics through Realization Theorems. Beginning with S4, several standard modal logics have been
shown to have justification counterparts: K, K4, S5, and so on. In this report we begin exploration
of the question: what is the range of modal logics that have justification counterparts. We introduce
general methodology that applies to all current examples, though non-constructively. We use this
machinery to establish realization results for some new justification logics based on modal logics
that have not been considered in justification context before. Our work is based on the machinery
introduced in [9], but which is now examined in a general setting. The results presented here are
not intended to be final, but represent a stage in a continuing investigation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Origin Story
The family of justification logics grew from a single instance, the logic of proofs, LP. This was
introduced by Sergei Artemov as an essential part of his program to create an arithmetic provability
semantics for intuitionistic logic. Features of LP have had a significant influence on research into
the developing group of justification logics, so it is appropriate that we begin with a brief discussion
of its history.
Go¨del, in a note [15], introduced the modern axiomatization of the modal logic S4, thinking
of the  operator as an informal provability operator. His primary interest was in intuitionistic
logic, and he also gave an embedding from it to S4: put  before every subformula. Informally,
this amounts to thinking of intuitionistic truth as provability. But he also noted that S4 does not
embed into Peano arithmetic, translating  as his formal provability operator. If it did, then the
S4 theorem ⊥ ⊃ ⊥ would turn into a provable statement asserting consistency, something ruled
out by his famous second incompleteness theorem. Since then it has been learned that the logic of
formal arithmetic provability is GL, Go¨del-Lo¨b logic, but this does not relate in the desired way to
intuitionistic logic.
In [16], Go¨del presented the idea that the  operator of S4 could be thought of as an explicit
proof representative, and this embedded into arithmetic. This was not published until many years
later, by which time the idea had been rediscovered independently by Sergei Artemov. Artemov’s
formal treatment involved the introduction of a new logic, LP. This is a modal-like language,
but with proof terms which one could think of as representing explicit proofs. It was necessary
to show that LP embedded into formal arithmetic, and this was done in Artemov’s Arithmetic
Completeness Theorem. But it was also necessary to show that S4 embedded into LP. This involved
the formulation and proof of Artemov’s Realization Theorem. A proper statement will be found in
Section 2.4. The definitive presentation of all this is in [1].
1.2 And Then
In [9] I introduced a Kripke-style semantics for LP, building on an earlier semantics, [18], that did
not use possible worlds. As was noted in [9], the methods that connected S4 with LP could also
make connections between standard weaker modal logics, K, K4, T, S4, and weaker versions of
LP. The Artemov Realization Theorem extended to these cases as well. There was an arithmetic
interpretation as well, because these were sublogics of S4, but the connection with arithmetic was
beginning to weaken. The term justification logics began being used because, while the connection
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with formal provability was fragmenting, proof terms (now called justification terms) still had
the role of supplying explicit justifications for (epistemically) necessary statements. Two fairly
comprehensive treatments of justification logics as such, and not just of the logic of proofs, can be
found in [2] and [4].
The logic S5 extended the picture a bit. A justification logic counterpart was created in [20, 22,
23], with a possible world semantics and a realization theorem. However, the resulting justification
logic did not have a satisfactory arithmetical interpretation, and the proof of realization was not
constructive. A non-constructive, semantic, proof of realization had been given in [9] for S4. It
also applied to standard weaker logics without significant change. The extension to S5 required
new ideas involving strong evidence functions. This will play a role here as well. The original
Artemov proof of realization, connecting S4 and LP, was constructive. Indeed, as a key part of
Artemov’s program to provide an arithmetic semantics for intuitionistic logic, it was essential that
it be constructive. S5 was the first case where a non-constructive proof was the first to be supplied.
Eventually, constructive proofs were found, but the door to a larger room was beginning to open.
1.3 And Now
A non-constructive, semantic, proof of realization first appeared in [9]. It is only now becoming
clear to me that the non-constructive argument has a broad applicability, and so there are many,
many more justification logics out there than I once thought. This report is the beginning of an
exploration of the scope of the justification idea.
Chapter 2
Justification Logics Axiomatically
2.1 Normal Modal Logics
In this report we are only interested in modal logics with a single necessity operator. Of course
multi-modal logics are well studied, and some justification analogs have been developed. But one
must begin somewhere. So, we have a modal operator, . (In what we do here, ♦ plays little role
so we mostly ignore it.) Formulas are built up from propositional letters, P , Q, . . . , in the usual
way. We will be flexible about connectives. Often we will assume we just have ⊃ and ⊥, with other
connectives defined. If convenient, we will assume a larger set of primitive connectives.
A normal modal logic is a set of (modal) formulas that contains all tautologies and all formulas
of the form (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (X ⊃ Y ), and is closed under uniform substitution, modus ponens,
and generalization (if X is present, so is X).
Here we are generally interested in normal modal logics for which a Hilbert system exists. We
assume they are axiomatized using a finite set of axiom schemes. The smallest normal logic is K
which is axiomatized in the familiar way.
K Axioms
• All tautologies (or enough of them)
• All formulas of the form (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (X ⊃ Y )
K Rules
• Modus Ponens X,X ⊃ Y ⇒ Y
• Necessitation X ⇒ X
There is no substitution rule since we are using axiom schemes, something we will do throughout.
Many other familiar normal logics can be axiomatized by adding a finite set of axiom schemes to
the K axioms above. We assume everybody knows axiom systems like K4, S4, and so on. We will
refer to such logics as axiomatically formulated.
One can also characterize modal logics using frames. Given a set F of frames, the set of modal
formulas valid in all modal models built on frames from F is a normal modal logic. We will refer
to such logics as frame based. Relationships between normality, axiomatics, and frames can be
complicated, but this does not concern us here.
To keep terminology simple, we will call a formula X a validity of a modal logic, using the same
word no matter what the formulation. If we have a normal modal logic, thought of as a set of
formulas, validity means being a member of the set. If we have an axiomatic formulation, validity
6
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means having an axiomatic proof. If we have a frame based modal logic, validity means being valid
in every model based on a frame in the given collection of frames.
2.2 Justification Logics
Justification logics, syntactically, are like modal logics except that justification terms take the place
of . We begin with the question of what is a justification term.
Definition 2.2.1 (Justification Term) Justification terms are built up as follows.
1. There is a set of justification variables, x, y, . . . . Every justification variable is a justification
term.
2. There is a set of justification constants, a, b, . . . , with indices, 1, 2, . . . . Every justification
constant is a justification term. (Indices may be omitted if it causes no problem.)
3. There are binary operation symbols, + and ·. If u and v are justification terms, so are (u+v)
and (u · v).
4. There may be additional function symbols, f , g, . . . , of various arities.. Which ones are
present depends on the logic. If f is an n-place justification function symbol and t1, . . . , tn
are justification terms, f(t1, . . . , tn) is a justification term.
Then justification formulas are built up from propositional letters using propositional connec-
tives together with the formation rule: if t is a justification term and X is a justification formula,
then t:X is a justification formula. The idea is that a justification term represents a reason why
something is so, and t:X asserts that X is so for reason t.
Loosely speaking, justification variables stand for arbitrary justification terms, and can be
substituted for under certain circumstances. Justification constants stand for reasons that are not
further analyzed—typically they are reasons for axioms. The · operation corresponds to modus
ponens. If X ⊃ Y is so for reason s and X is so for reason t, then Y is so for reason s · t. (Note
that reasons are not unique—Y may be true for other reasons too.) The + operation is a kind of
weakening. If X is so for either reason s or reason t, then s+ t is also a reason for X.
There is no obvious justification analog of normality. For instance, we will not have (or want)
closure under substitution. Justifications for things should become more complicated when propo-
sitional letters are replaced with complex formulas—see [10]. Instead of the generality available
with modal logics, we assume the justification logics we are concerned with are always specified
axiomatically, using axiom schemes. There can also be semantic specifications, or sequent calculi,
but we will take axiomatics as basic.
The weakest justification logic is J0, axiomatized as follows.
J0 Axioms
• All tautologies (or enough of them)
• All formulas of the form s:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (t:X ⊃ [s · t]:Y )
• All formulas of the forms s:X ⊃ [s+ t]:X and t:X ⊃ [s+ t]:X
J0 Rules
• Modus Ponens X,X ⊃ Y ⇒ Y
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There is no necessitation rule, but one will come back shortly in a somewhat different form.
Other justification logics will be axiomatized by adding additional axiom schemes to J0.
Constant specifications are used to justify axioms of a justification logic, which are not further
analyzed. Formally, a constant specification CS for a given justification logic J is a set of formulas
of the form en:en−1:. . . e1:A with n ≥ 1, where A is an axiom of J , and e1, e2, . . . , en are similar
constants with indices 1, 2, . . . , n. It is assumed that CS contains all intermediate specifications in
the sense that, whenever en :en−1 :. . . e1 :A is in CS, then en−1 :. . . e1 :A is in CS too. Members of
constant specifications will be treated as additional axioms for justification logics.
A number of special conditions have been considered for constant specifications. Here we are
primarily interested in just one. A constant specification CS for a given axiomatically specified
justification logic is axiomatically appropriate if every axiom of the logic, including members of the
constant specification itself, have justifications. More formally, for each axiom A of the justification
logic in question, there is a constant e1 such that e1:A is in CS, and if en:en−1:. . . e1:A ∈ CS, then
en+1:en:en−1:. . . e1:A ∈ CS, for each n ≥ 1.
Justification Logics In this report, a justification logic will be axiomatically characterized as J0
extended with a finite set of axiom schemes (involving function symbols in addition to · and +),
together with a constant specification CS whose members are also taken to be axioms. Suppose
J is such a justification logic, and S is a set of formulas (not schemes) of the justification logic.
We write S `J X if there is a finite sequence of formulas, ending with X, in which each formula
is either an axiom of J , a member of S, or follows from earlier formulas by modus ponens. Since
there is no necessitation rule, the usual proof of the deduction theorem applies.
2.3 Internalization
Instead of the usual necessitation rule justification logics have an explicit version, under the right
circumstances.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Internalization) Suppose J is a justification logic with an axiomatically ap-
propriate constant specification CS. J satisfies internalization. That is, if `J X then `J t:X, for
some justification term t.
Proof By a simple induction on proof length. Suppose `J X. If X is an axiom of J (which
includes being a member of CS) there is a justification constant en such that en:X is in CS, and
so en :X is provable. If X follows by modus ponens from Y ⊃ X and Y then, by the Induction
Hypothesis, `J s:(Y ⊃ X) and `J t:Y for some s, t. Using the J0 Axiom for ·, `J [s · t]:X.
2.4 Counterparts
There is an obvious mapping from the language(s) of justification logic to modal language—it is
called the forgetful functor. For each justification formula X, let X◦ be the result of recursively
replacing every subformula t:A with A. More formally, P ◦ = P if P is atomic; (A ⊃ B)◦ = (A◦ ⊃
B◦); and [t:A]◦ = A◦. We want to know the circumstances under which the set of theorems of a
justification logic is mapped exactly to the set of theorems of a modal logic.
Definition 2.4.1 Suppose KL is a normal modal logic. Also let JL be a justification logic (thus
extending the axiomatic J0, from Section 2.2, with a finite number of additional axiom schemes
and a constant specification CS). We say JL is a counterpart of KL if the following holds.
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1. If X is a theorem of JL then X◦ is a validity of KL.
2. If Y is a validity of KL then there is some theorem X of JL so that X◦ = Y .
In other words, JL is a counterpart of KL if the forgetful functor is a mapping from the set of
theorems of JL onto the set of theorems of KL. Our definition is syntactic in nature. See Section 3.6
for further comments.
As the subject has developed so far, justification logics have generally been formulated so that
item 1 of Definition 2.4.1 is simple to show. Item 2 is known as a Realization result—X is said
to realize Y . This is not at all simple, and is the central topic of the present report. Realization
theorems are (almost?) always shown in a stronger form than just stated. Here is a proper
formulation.
Definition 2.4.2 (Normal Realization) This continues Definition 2.4.1, and uses the same no-
tation. Theorem X of JL is a normal realization of theorem Y of KL if X◦ = Y , and X results
from the replacement of negative occurrences of  in Y with distinct justification variables (and
positive occurrences by justification terms that need not be variables).
That some justification logic is a counterpart of some modal logic is (always?) proved by
showing normal realizations exist for modal theorems. For some modal logics there are algorithms
for producing normal realizations, but there are cases where no known algorithms exist, though
one still has normal realizations. The extent of algorithmic realization is unclear.
Chapter 3
Some Examples
3.1 S4 and the first justification logic
LP is the first of the justification logics. Besides · and + it has a one-place function symbol,
customarily written ! with no parentheses, with the following axiom schemes (and their S4 analogs).
LP S4
t:X ⊃ X X ⊃ X
t:X ⊃!t:t:X X ⊃ X
Provided an axiomatically appropriate constant specification is used, LP is a counterpart of S4.
This is the historically first example of a counterpart relationship between a modal logic and a
justification logic. For realization, an algorithm was developed to compute a normal realization for
a modal formula X from a cut-free sequent calculus proof of X.
There are well-known sublogics of S4, namely K, K4, T, that are axiomatized by dropping axioms
from the S4 list above. Dropping the corresponding axioms from the LP list yields justification
counterparts using essentially the same realization algorithm that worked for LP, but omitting
parts that are no longer relevant.
A justification counterpart for a modal logic is generally not unique. If we replace the second
LP axiom above with t :X ⊃ f(t) : g(t) :X (where f and g are one-place function symbols) we
get a different justification counterpart for S4. On the other hand, replacing t :X ⊃!t : t:X with
h(t, u):X ⊃ t:u:X almost certainly does not yield an S4 justification counterpart, though I have no
proof of this.
S4 is among the best-known modal logics, so it hardly needs mention that semantically the
axiom system is complete with respect to the family of models with frames 〈G,R〉 for which R is
reflexive and transitive.
3.2 S5, a very familiar modal logic
The modal logic S5 is perhaps the most commonly applied modal logic. It is axiomatized by
adding a negative introspection scheme to S4, ¬X ⊃ ¬X. Semantically, it is characterized
using frames involving equivalence relations.
A justification counterpart appears in the literature, [20, 21], and goes under the name JT45.
An additional one-place function symbol, ?, is added to the language (as with !, parentheses are
dropped), and an axiom scheme ¬t:X ⊃?t:(¬t:X) is adopted. As with S4, this axiomatization is
not unique and variations exist.
10
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3.3 K43, a somewhat obscure modal logic
The modal logic K43 is one of a family, K4n, from [7]. It extends K with the schema X ⊃ X.
(The well-known logic K4 is K42 in this family.) As with S4, there is more than one justification
counterpart for K43. We will concentrate on the following one. Let ! and !! be one-place function
symbols. Then a justification counterpart for K43 results from adding to J0 the axiom schema
t :X ⊃!!t : !t : t :X, along with an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. We call this
justification logic J43.
Axiomatic K43 is complete with respect to models based on frames 〈G,R〉 meeting a kind of
extended transitivity condition: Γ1RΓ2RΓ3RΓ4 implies Γ1RΓ4.
3.4 S4.2, a better known modal logic
Axiomatically, S4.2 extends S4 with the axiom scheme ♦X ⊃ ♦X. This logic is complete
with respect to the family of models based on frames that are reflexive, transitive, and convergent,
meaning that whenever Γ1RΓ2 and Γ1RΓ3, there is some Γ4 such that Γ2RΓ4 and Γ3RΓ4. We
briefly present part of a soundness argument, because this will be instructive in the next chapter.
Suppose we have a modal model M = 〈G,R,V〉 whose frame is reflexive, transitive, and con-
vergent. (Notation is defined in Section 4.1, but should be clear now.) Suppose that Γ1 ∈ G and
M,Γ1  ♦X but M,Γ1 6 ♦X; we derive a contradiction. By the first item, for some Γ2 ∈ G
with Γ1RΓ2, M,Γ2  X, and by the second item, for some Γ3 ∈ G with Γ1RΓ3, M,Γ3 6 ♦X.
Since the frame is convergent, there is some Γ4 with Γ2RΓ4 and Γ3RΓ4. But then we have both
M,Γ4  X and M,Γ4 6 X, our contradiction.
For a justification counterpart we build on LP, a counterpart of S4. We add two function
symbols, f and g, each two-place, and adopt the following axiom scheme.
¬f(t, u):¬t:X ⊃ g(t, u):¬u:¬X (3.1)
We call this justification logic J4.2.
Although we primarily have a formal interest here, a few words about (3.1) might be in order.
In LP, because of the axiom scheme t:X ⊃ X, we have provability of (t:X ∧ u:¬X) ⊃ ⊥, for any t
and u, and thus provability of ¬t:X∨¬u:¬X. In any context one of the disjuncts must hold. Axiom
scheme (3.1) is equivalent to f(t, u):¬t:X ∨ g(t, u):¬u:¬X. Informally, this says that in any context
we have means for computing a justification for the disjunct that holds. It is a strong assumption,
but not implausible in some cases. We do not pursue the point further here.
3.5 Canonical Modal Logics
All the modal logics considered above in this chapter are canonical. The key feature of such
logics is that the canonical model is one that meets the frame conditions specified for the logic.
Completeness, then, is an immediate consequence. All this is well-known. We provide a very brief
sketch because it will be pertinent in the next chapter.
Let KL be a normal modal logic. Call a set S of formulas KL-consistent provided, for no
X1, . . . , Xn ∈ S is (X1∧. . .∧Xn) ⊃ ⊥ valid in KL. Using Lindenbaum’s Lemma, every KL-consistent
set can be extended to a maximally KL-consistent set.
Let G be the set of all maximally KL-consistent sets. For a set S of formulas, let S] = {X |
X ∈ S}. Now, for Γ,∆ ∈ G, let ΓR∆ provided Γ] ⊆ ∆. This gives us a frame, 〈G,R〉. Finally,
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for atomic P , take P to be true at Γ ∈ G (Γ ∈ V(P )) provided P ∈ Γ. This completely specifies a
model M = 〈G,R,V〉, called the canonical model for KL.
The key fact about the canonical modelM for logic KL is the Truth Lemma, which asserts that
for any Γ ∈ G and for any formula X, X ∈ Γ ⇔ M,Γ  X. The proof is by induction on the
degree of X, is standard, and is widely known. It follows that a canonical model is a universal
counter-model. For, suppose X is not valid in KL. Then {¬X} is KL-consistent, and so can be
extended to a maximally consistent set Γ. Then Γ ∈ G and, by the Truth Lemma, M,Γ 6 X.
It can happen that the canonical model is not actually a model for its logic. But, if the canonical
model does turn out to be a model for its logic, completeness is immediate. When this happens,
the logic itself is called canonical. All the modal logics considered above are canonical. Canonicity
is a key issue for what we do here.
For most of the logics of this chapter, establishing canonicity is easy. For S4.2 things are a bit
more complicated. Since this will be pertinent later on, we give the argument.
Suppose, in the canonical modelM for S4.2 we have Γ1RΓ2 and Γ1RΓ3. If we could show that
Γ]2 ∪Γ]3 was consistent, then it could be extended to a maximally consistent Γ4, and we would have
Γ2RΓ4 andΓ3RΓ4. So, let us suppose Γ]2 ∪ Γ]3 is not S4.2 consistent, and derive a contradiction.
	 R
R 	
Γ1
Γ2 Γ3
Γ]2 ∪ Γ]3 ⊆ Γ4
To simplify the discussion we begin with the following observation. It tells us that we can
replace arguments about finite subsets of Γ] with arguments involving single members of Γ].
Lemma 3.5.1 Suppose Γ is a possible world in the canonical model. Then A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ] if and
only if A1 ∧ . . . ∧An ∈ Γ] (parenthesized however).
Proof Suppose A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ]. Then A1, . . . ,An ∈ Γ. In any normal modal logic, A1 ⊃
(A2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ (An ⊃ (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An)) . . .) is valid. Since worlds in the canonical model are
maximally consistent, it follows that (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) ∈ Γ, and hence A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∈ Γ]. The
converse is similar, using the validities (A1 ∧ . . . ∧Ai ∧ . . . ∧An) ⊃ Ai.
Now, suppose Γ]2 ∪ Γ]3 is not S4.2 consistent. Then (using Lemma 3.5.1) there are A ∈ Γ]2 and
B ∈ Γ]3 so that B ⊃ ¬A is valid, and hence so is B ⊃ ¬A. Since A ∈ Γ]2, A ∈ Γ2. Similarly,
B ∈ Γ3. Since Γ1RΓ2 then Γ]1 ⊆ Γ2, so ¬A 6∈ Γ1 by consistency of Γ2, and so ¬¬A ∈ Γ1,
by maximality of Γ1. That is, ♦A ∈ Γ1. Then, using ♦A ⊃ ♦A and maximal consistency,
♦A ∈ Γ1. But Γ1RΓ3 so Γ]1 ⊆ Γ3, and hence ♦A ∈ Γ3, that is, ¬¬A ∈ Γ3. But B ∈ Γ3, and
B ⊃ ¬A is valid, so ¬A ∈ Γ3. This shows inconsistency of Γ3, and is our desired contradiction.
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3.6 A few observations
We discussed modal/justification counterparts in Section 2.4. For modal KL and justification JL to
be counterparts, both items of Definition 2.4.1 must be satisfied. It is important to note that the
two are quite independent of each other. We now have examples that illustrate this.
First, consider the pair LP and S5. If X is a theorem of LP, X◦ will be a theorem of S5,
because LP embeds into S4, and this is a sublogic of S5. But there are theorems of S5 that have
no realization in LP; ¬X ⊃ ¬X is an obvious example. If ¬X ⊃ ¬X had a realization
in LP, which is a counterpart of S4, the forgetful projection of this realization would be a theorem
of S4, which means ¬X ⊃ ¬X would be an S4 theorem. Thus we have item 1 but not item 2
from Definition 2.4.1.
Next, consider the pair JT45 and S4. The forgetful functor does not map the set of theorems
of JT45 into the set of theorems of S4; ¬t:X ⊃?t:(¬t:X) maps outside of S4. But it is the case
that every theorem of S4 has a realization in JT45, because S4 and LP are counterparts, and LP is
a sublogic of JT45. In this case we have item 2 from Definition 2.4.1, but not item 1.
Chapter 4
Semantics
There are several semantics that have been introduced for justification logics: arithmetic, due to
Artemov, [1]; Mkrtychev, [18]; and a possible world semantics commonly known as Fitting models,
[9]. Recently modular models have been introduced, [3], and also [17]. Fitting models play a
fundamental role in our realization proof, which originated in [9], but which is presented here with
modifications coming from [12, 14, 13].
4.1 Fitting Models
As usual, a frame is a directed graph, 〈G,R〉, with G being the nodes or possible worlds, and R
being the directed edges, or accessibility relation.
Frames are the basis of the familiar possible world modal models, and also of Fitting justification
logic models. In either case, one specifies which atomic formulas are to be considered true at which
possible worlds; that is, one assumes there is a mapping V from atoms to subsets of G so that
V(⊥) = ∅. For a propositional letter P , we understand that P is true at Γ ∈ G if Γ ∈ V(P ).
Now modal and Fitting justification models diverge. For a modal model, truth of formulas is
calculated at each possible world. Specifically, if M = 〈G,R,V〉, we write M,Γ  X to indicate
that modal formula X is true at possible world Γ of G. The familiar conditions are listed for later
reference.
1. if A is atomic, M,Γ  A if A ∈ V(Γ)
2. M,Γ  X ⊃ Y if and only if M,Γ 6 X or M,Γ  Y
3. M,Γ  X if and only if M,∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆
Other connectives and ♦ can be taken to be defined.
Fitting models assume the language is not modal, but involves justification terms as in Sec-
tion 2.2. To deal with these models have an additional piece of machinery, syntactic in nature: an
evidence function. Such a function, E , maps justification terms and formulas to sets of possible
worlds. The idea is, Γ ∈ E(t,X) informally means that, at possible world Γ, t is relevant evidence
for the truth of X. Relevant evidence need not be conclusive. Then, a Fitting model for a jus-
tification logic is a structure M = 〈G,R,V, E〉, where 〈G,R,V〉 is as above, and E is an evidence
function. Truth conditions 1 and 2 are the same as above. Condition 3 is not pertinent since  is
not part of a justification language. It is replaced with the following.
4. M,Γ  t:X if and only if
14
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(a) M,∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆
(b) Γ ∈ E(t,X)
Thus t:X is true at a possible world if X is true at all accessible worlds and t is relevant evidence
for X at Γ.
When working with modal models various frame conditions are imposed, transitivity, symmetry,
convergence, etc. This is done with Fitting models in exactly the same way. One also puts
conditions on Fitting model evidence functions. Since we have assumed + and · are always present
axiomatically, we always require the following semantically. There may be additional conditions
for particular justification logics.
5. E(s,X ⊃ Y ) ∩ E(t,X) ⊆ E(s · t, Y )
6. E(s,X) ∪ E(t,X) ⊆ E(s+ t,X)
A justification formula X is valid in a Fitting modelM = 〈G,R,V, E〉 provided, for each Γ ∈ G,
M,Γ  X. Likewise X is valid in a class of Fitting models if it is valid in every member of the
class.
A Fitting modelM = 〈G,R,V, E〉meets a constant specification CS provided, for each t:X ∈ CS,
E(t,X) = G. Recall that members of a constant specification are of the form en:en−1:. . . e1:A where
A is an axiom (of some particular axiomatic system). It was also assumed that if en:en−1:. . . e1:A
is in CS so is en−1 :. . . e1 :A. Then it is easy to show, by induction on n, that if all axioms of a
particular axiomatic system are valid in M, and if M meets constant specification CS, then all
members of CS must be valid in M.
4.2 Special Kinds of Models
Special conditions can be imposed on Fitting models, and sometimes must be. The first we discuss
is being fully explanatory, originating in [9]. Informally, a model is fully explanatory if anything
that is necessary has a reason. More properly, a Fitting modelM = 〈G,R,V, E〉 is fully explanatory
provided that, whenever M,∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆, there is some justification term t
so thatM,Γ  t:X. This has a certain intuitive desirability, but in fact it will play no role in what
we do here.
The second special condition is that of having a strong evidence function, something we believe
originated in [22]. Condition 4 in Section 4.1 has two parts. It says M,Γ  t :X provided (a)
M,∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆, and (b) Γ ∈ E(t,X). A strong evidence function is one for
which condition (b) implies condition (a), and is thus sufficient by itself. Informally this amounts
to assuming that we are not dealing with mere relevant evidence, but with conclusive evidence.
This condition will play a role here.
Fully explanatory and strong evidence seem to behave very differently. Given a class F of Fitting
models specified by conditions on accessibility and evidence, those that are fully explanatory form
a subclass. There are no known examples of axiom systems whose soundness can be shown with
respect to models in that subclass, but not for F itself. The completeness proofs considered here
are justification versions of canonical model constructions, and it turns out that canonical models
are always fully explanatory, provided an axiomatically appropriate constant specification is used.
Thus being fully explanatory is a nice feature that is almost free.
The story with strong evidence functions is quite another thing, however. Once again, canonical
models always have strong evidence functions. But there are examples where no natural class F
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of Fitting models exists with respect to which a particular justification logic is sound, without also
imposing the requirement that we have a strong evidence function. A justification counterpart of
S5 is such a case, [22], and so is J4.2 from Section 3.4. The bad news is that it can be quite difficult
to construct particular models with strong evidence functions, though without the restriction it is
much less of a problem. The good news is that this will not matter when we come to realization
results.
4.3 Examples Continued Again
Fitting models for LP and its sublogics are well-known, so we omit discussion of them here. Instead
we give examples that involve the logics K43 and J43 from Section 3.3, and S4.2 and J4.2 from
Section 3.4.
4.3.1 The Logic J43
For J43, we consider the following class of Fitting models, which we simply call J43 models. These
are models M = 〈G,R,V, E〉 that meet the conditions below.
Following [7], for Γ,∆ ∈ G, let ΓR3∆ mean that there are ∆1,∆2 ∈ G so that ΓR∆1R∆2R∆. A
modal model for K43 must meet the condition: if ΓR3∆ then ΓR∆, a generalization of transitivity.
We require frames of J43 models to meet the same condition.
Conditions for the evidence function generalize those for the more common justification logic
J4 in a straightforward way.
Γ ∈ E(t,X) =⇒

Γ ∈ E(!!t, !t:t:X) (1)
ΓR∆ =⇒ ∆ ∈ E(!t, t:X) (2)
ΓR2∆ =⇒ ∆ ∈ E(t,X) (3)
We verify that t:X ⊃!!t:!t:t:X is valid in all J43 models. Let M = 〈G,R,V, E〉 be such a model,
Γ ∈ G, and suppose M,Γ  t:X but M,Γ 6!!t:!t:t:X; we derive a contradiction
SinceM,Γ  t:X, we must have Γ ∈ E(t,X). Because we have this and (1), butM,Γ 6!!t:!t:t:X,
there must be some ∆1 ∈ G with ΓR∆1, and M,∆1 6!t:t:X.
SinceM,Γ  t:X and ΓR∆1, by (2) we must have ∆1 ∈ E(!t, t:X). By this, andM,∆1 6!t:t:X,
there must be some ∆2 ∈ G with ∆1R∆2, and M,∆2 6 t:X.
Again, since M,Γ  t:X and ΓR2∆2, by (3) we must have ∆2 ∈ E(t,X). Then since M,∆2 6
t:X, there must be some ∆ ∈ G with ∆2R∆ and M,∆ 6 X.
Now, by assumption,M,Γ  t:X. Also ΓR3∆ so by the frame condition, ΓR∆. It follows that
M,∆  X, and we have a contradiction.
4.3.2 The logic J4.2
M = 〈G,R,V, E〉 is a J4.2 Fitting model if it meets the following special conditions.
1. The frame 〈G,R〉 is reflexive, transitive, and convergent, as with S4.2 in Section 3.4.
2. E(t,X) ⊆ E(!t, t:X)
3. Γ ∈ E(t,X) and ΓR∆ implies ∆ ∈ E(t,X).
4. E(f(t, u),¬t:X) ∪ E(g(t, u),¬u:¬X) = G
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5. E is a strong evidence function, as discussed in Section 4.2.
Items 1, 2 and 3 together give soundness of the usual LP axiom schemas t:X ⊃ X and t:X ⊃!t:t:X.
We skip details. We do verify soundness for (3.1), ¬f(t, u):¬t:X ⊃ g(t, u):¬u:¬X. Suppose the
formula fails at Γ in modelM; we derive a contradiction. If it fails at Γ thenM,Γ 6 f(t, u):¬t:X and
M,Γ 6 g(t, u):¬u:¬X. Because E is a strong evidence function, it must be that Γ 6∈ E(f(t, u),¬t:X)
and Γ 6∈ E(g(t, u),¬u:¬X). But this contradicts condition 4. Note that this argument is extremely
trivial when compared to the argument in Section 3.4. The assumption of a strong evidence function
is a strong assumption indeed.
4.3.3 A Remark About Strong Evidence Functions
Imposing a strong evidence assumption can sometimes make other requirements on a model re-
dundant. For instance, if we restrict the semantics for J43 in Section 4.3.1 to models with strong
evidence functions, two of the three conditions on evidence functions are unnecessary. Assume, for
this discussion, that Γ ∈ E(t,X). We retain consequence (1) that Γ ∈ E(!!t, !t:t:X), but we can drop
(2) and (3) by the following reasoning.
Suppose also that ΓR∆. We are still assuming Γ ∈ E(!!t, !t:t:X). Since E is a strong evidence
function, it follows that M,Γ !!t:!t:t:X. Then since ΓR∆, we must have that M,∆ !t:t:X, and
hence ∆ ∈ E(!t, t:X). Redundancy of the third condition has a similar argument.
For J4.2 in Section 4.3.2, a similar argument shows that condition 3 is unnecessary.
These are not meant to be deep observations, but they may be of some significance.
4.4 Canonical Models
Canonical models are a common way of proving completeness for modal logics, when it works.
There is a direct analog for justification logics, from [9]. We repeat things here because canonical
justification models play a central role in proving realizability, again, when it works.
For this section let J be some axiomatically formulated justification logic. Then it extends
the system J0 from Section 2.2. If S is a set of formulas of J, we write S `J X and mean by it
that Y1 ⊃ (Y2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ (Yn ⊃ X) . . .) is provable in J for some Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn ∈ S. We say S is
J-inconsistent if S `J ⊥, and S is J-consistent if it is not J-inconsistent.
The canonical model for J, MJ = 〈G,R,V, E〉 is defined as follows.
• G is the set of all maximally J-consistent sets of formulas.
• If Γ ∈ G, let Γ] = {X | t:X ∈ Γ for some justification term t}. For Γ,∆ ∈ G, ΓR∆ if Γ] ⊆ ∆.
• For atomic A, Γ ∈ V(A) if A ∈ Γ.
• Γ ∈ E(t,X) if t:X ∈ Γ.
This completes the definition of canonical model. To show it is a Fitting model we must show
it meets conditions 5 and 6 from Section 4.1. These are simple. Condition 5 is that E(s,X ⊃
Y ) ∩ E(t,X) ⊆ E(s · t, Y ). Well, suppose Γ ∈ E(s,X ⊃ Y ) and Γ ∈ E(t,X). By definition of E ,
s:(X ⊃ Y ) ∈ Γ and t:X ∈ Γ. Since J axiomatically extends J0, s:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (t:X ⊃ s · t:Y ) is
an axiom. Since Γ is maximally consistent, it follows that s · t:Y ∈ Γ, and hence Γ ∈ E(s · t, Y ).
Condition 6 is E(s,X) ∪ E(t,X) ⊆ E(s + t,X), and is treated the same way using J0 axioms
s:X ⊃ s+ t:X and t:X ⊃ s+ t:X.
As with modal canonical models, the key item to show is a truth lemma. Curiously, for justifi-
cation logics the proof is simpler than in the modal case.
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Theorem 4.4.1 (Truth Lemma) In the canonical model MJ = 〈G,R,V, E〉, for any Γ ∈ G and
any formula X,
MJ,Γ  X ⇐⇒ X ∈ Γ (4.1)
Proof The proof is by induction on the complexity of X. The atomic case is by definition. Propo-
sitional connective cases are by the usual argument, making use of maximal consistency of Γ. This
leaves the justification case. Assume (4.1) holds for formulas simpler than X.
Suppose t :X ∈ Γ. By definition of E we have Γ ∈ E(t,X). Let ∆ be an arbitrary member
of G with ΓR∆. Then Γ] ⊆ ∆, so X ∈ ∆, and by the induction hypothesis, MJ,∆  X. Then
MJ,Γ  t:X.
Suppose t:X 6∈ Γ. Then Γ 6∈ E(t,X), so MJ,Γ 6 t:X.
The evidence function, E , in the canonical model, is a strong evidence function. For, suppose
Γ ∈ E(t,Γ). Then, by definition of E , t :X ∈ Γ so by Theorem 4.4.1, MJ,Γ  t :X. And then
MJ,∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆.
It is also the case that, if J has an axiomatically appropriate constant specification, the canonical
model must be fully explanatory. We will not need this here, and so omit the proof.
As usual, the canonical model is a universal counter model, and by the usual argument. If
6`J X then {¬X} is consistent. If Γ is any maximal consistent extension of {¬X}, Γ ∈ G and by
Theorem 4.4.1, MJ,Γ 6 X. Then the completeness question reduces to the following—a direct
analog of what happens in modal logic. We may have some class FJ of Fitting models, and we
want to prove completeness of J relative to this class. If it turns out that the canonical model MJ
is in FJ, we have succeeded.
In modal logic, there are well-known examples of completeness proofs that do not take the
canonical model route (and cannot). Go¨del-Lo¨b logic is a prominent such logic. Other techniques
are available for cases like these. For justification logics thus far, all axiomatic completeness results
make use of canonical models directly. This phenomenon needs to be investigated further.
4.5 Examples Continued Even Further
In Section 3.3 a logic, J43 was introduced axiomatically, and in Section 3.4 another, J4.2. Semantics
were given for these in Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 respectively. We now show that the canonical
models for these axiomatically formulated logics are of the right semantic type, and so completeness
results follow.
There are two parts to showing a canonical model meets appropriate conditions. First, the
evidence function should have the right properties. Second, the underlying frame should meet
appropriate frame conditions. These are separate arguments. Only the second has relevance to our
realization results in the next chapter.
4.5.1 J43 Completeness
We divide showing that the canonical model J43 has the right properties into two parts, roughly
syntactic and semantic.
Evidence Function Conditions We saw in Section 4.3.3 that when dealing with a strong evi-
dence function, as the canonical model has, only one of the three evidence function conditions
needs to be established. We must show Γ ∈ E(t,X) =⇒ Γ ∈ E(!!t, !t:t:X). From the definition
of evidence function in canonical models, this is equivalent to t:X ∈ Γ =⇒!!t:!t:t:X ∈ Γ. Since
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t:X ⊃!!t:!t:t:X is an axiom of J43 and possible worlds of canonical models are maximally
consistent, this is immediate.
Frame Conditions We must show that, in the canonical model for J43, if ΓR3∆ then ΓR∆. Well,
suppose ΓR∆1R∆2R∆. Then Γ] ⊆ ∆1, ∆]1 ⊆ ∆2, and ∆]2 ⊆ ∆. We must show Γ] ⊆ ∆.
Suppose X ∈ Γ]. Then for some justification term t, t:X ∈ Γ. Since t:X ⊃!!t:!t:t:X is an
axiom, by maximal consistency of Γ, !!t:!t:t:X ∈ Γ. But then !t:t:X ∈ ∆1, and so t:X ∈ ∆2,
and thus X ∈ ∆.
4.5.2 J4.2 Completeness
Completeness holds under the assumption that J4.2 has an axiomatically appropriate constant
specification. Such an assumption was not needed for J43. Again we divide showing canonicity into
two parts. Axiomatically, J4.2 extends axiomatic LP by adding the scheme ¬f(t, u):¬t:X ⊃ g(t, u):
¬u:¬X. Semantically, J4.2 models are Fitting LP models meeting additional conditions. We omit
checking the LP conditions. We already know the canonical model has a strong evidence function.
What remains to show is that the evidence function satisfies E(f(t, u),¬t:X)∪E(g(t, u),¬u:¬X) = G,
and that the frame is convergent.
Evidence Function Conditions Because of the way the evidence function is defined in canonical
models, showing the evidence function satisfies E(f(t, u),¬t:X) ∪ E(g(t, u),¬u:¬X) = G is
equivalent to showing that for each Γ in the canonical model, f(t, u):¬t:X ∈ Γ or g(t, u):¬u:
¬X ∈ Γ. This is an immediate consequence of ¬f(t, u):¬t:X ⊃ g(t, u):¬u:¬X.
Frame Conditions In Section 3.5 we introduced a simplification designed to keep the clutter
down, Lemma 3.5.1. A similar thing can be done here.
Lemma 4.5.1 Suppose Γ is a possible world in the canonical Fitting justification model for
some justification logic that satisfies internalization. Then A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ] if and only if
A1 ∧ . . . ∧An ∈ Γ].
This has a similar appearance to Lemma 3.5.1, but the definition of the sharp operation is dif-
ferent. We leave the proof to the reader. Note that by Theorem 2.3.1, we have internalization
if we have an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. Now, here is the argument
that the canonical model has a convergent frame. It is an exact counterpart of the argument
given in Section 3.5.
Suppose, in the canonical model for J4.2 we have Γ1RΓ2 and Γ1RΓ3. Exactly as in Section 3.5,
it is enough to show Γ]2 ∪ Γ]3 is consistent (though the sharp operation is different now).
Suppose otherwise. Then, using the Lemma above, There are A ∈ Γ]2 and B ∈ Γ]3 so that
B ⊃ ¬A is provable. Since A ∈ Γ]2, for some justification term t, t:A ∈ Γ2. Similarly, since
B ∈ Γ]3, u:B ∈ Γ3 for some u. Since we have internalization, for some justification term a,
a:(B ⊃ ¬A) is provable, and hence so is u:B ⊃ (a · u):¬A. Since Γ1RΓ2 then Γ]1 ⊆ Γ2, so
f(t, a · u):¬t:A 6∈ Γ1 since t:A ∈ Γ2 and Γ2 is consistent. Then ¬f(t, a · u):¬t:A ∈ Γ1. Using
the axiom ¬f(t, a · u):¬t:A ⊃ g(t, a · u):¬a · u:¬A and maximal consistency of Γ1, we have
g(t, a · u):¬a · u:¬A ∈ Γ1. Since Γ]1 ⊆ Γ3, ¬a · u:¬A ∈ Γ3. Since u:B ⊃ (a · u):¬A. ¬u:B ∈ Γ3,
a contradiction since u:B ∈ Γ3.
Chapter 5
Realization
Most proofs of realization do things in one pass. The first realization proof, which provides an
algorithm suitable for LP and some closely related logics, can be found in [1]. It converts a sequent
calculus S4 proof into an LP realization. Since then several different algorithmic proofs have been
developed. In [11], for instance, an approach was introduced that does not work globally with a
sequent calculus proof, but instead works through the sequent proof step by step. But here we
follow a different line, originating in [9], where a non-constructive proof of realization for LP was
presented. A key feature, whose significance I did not realize until later, was that it was a two-stage
process. Eventually, in [14], the two stages were clearly separated, and the output of the first stage
was given a name, quasi-realization. This was applied in [13] to provide not only an algorithm for
LP, but an implementation of it. It is this two-stage approach that we follow here.
Quasi-realizations are similar to realizations, but have a more complex form. They still provide
an embedding from a modal logic into a justification logic, and can serve some of the functions that
realizations were designed for. At a second stage, quasi-realizations are converted into realizations.
There are features of both stages that are of significance.
The second stage, conversion from quasi-realizations to realizations, is algorithmic. It depends
only on formula structure and not on input of a sequent calculus proof. And it is independent of
the particular logic in question—that is, it is uniform across the family of justification logics.
The first stage may or may not be algorithmic. In this report we present a non-algorithmic
version that covers a broad range of logics. To be algorithmic, the modal logic to be realized
into must have some proof procedure in which formulas do not change polarity. This is generally
described as cut-free, but the real point is that cut involves a polarity change. So far sequent calculi,
tableau systems, hypersequents, nested sequents [6], and prefixed tableau systems have been used
for this purpose. An abstract understanding is missing, but all the obvious candidates have worked.
The plan for this chapter is as follows. First produce a quasi-realization. We do this non-
constructively here, covering a wide range of logics. As noted above, constructive approaches are
possible in special cases that can be found in the literature. Second, convert a quasi-realization to
a realization. This stage is always constructive.
5.1 Annotated and Signed Formulas
We will be mapping modal formulas to justification formulas. Since we want normal realizations,
Definition 2.4.2, we must keep track of specific occurrences of . In [11] we introduced annotated
formulas, and in [14, 13] a simpler version. It is the simpler version that we use now.
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Definition 5.1.1 An annotated modal formula is like a standard modal formula except for the
following.
1. Instead of a single modal operator  there is an infinite family, 1, 2, . . . , called indexed
modal operators. Formulas are built up as usual, but using indexed modal operators instead
of . We assume that in an annotated formula, no index occurs twice.
2. If A is an annotated formula, and A′ is the result of replacing all indexed modal operators,
n, with , forgetting the index, then A′ is a conventional modal formula. We say A is an
annotated version of A′, and A′ is an unannotated version of A.
Annotations, indexes, are purely for bookkeeping purposes. Semantically they are ignored.
Thus n and  behave alike in models, and so a modal formula and an annotated version of it
evaluate the same at each possible world.
It is also necessary, for normal realizations, that we keep track of positive and negative sub-
formula occurrences. For this purpose, it is very helpful to make use of machinery familiar from
signed tableau systems.
Definition 5.1.2 Let T and F be two symbols, not part of our modal or justification languages.
A signed formula is T X or F X, where X is a formula. We allow X to be a justification formula,
a modal formula, or an annotated modal formula.
When working with tableaus, one thinks of T X as an assertion that X is true (under some
circumstance), and F X that X is false. All this plays a role in [13], but not here. In the present
treatment, signs are simply for bookkeeping purposes. Still, we should note that for T X ⊃ Y to
be verified, informally, we must consider circumstances where either F X or T Y is so. Likewise,
for F X ⊃ Y to be verified, we must consider circumstances where T X and F Y are so. This
observation may help motivate item 2 in Definition 5.2.1, and similarly for the other cases.
5.2 Quasi-Realizations
Particular choices of modal or justification logics are not important just now. The definitions in this
section have to do with languages, not logics. We define a mapping from signed annotated modal
formulas to sets of signed justification formulas involving some set of function symbols including
at least + and ·.
Important Note From now on we assume that v1, v2, . . . is an enumeration of all justification
variables with no variable repeated, fixed once and for all.
Definition 5.2.1 The mapping 〈〈 · 〉〉 associates with each signed annotated modal formula a set of
signed justification formulas. It is defined recursively, as follows.
1. If A is atomic, 〈〈T A 〉〉 = {T A} and 〈〈F A 〉〉 = {F A}.
2. 〈〈T A ⊃ B 〉〉 = {T U ⊃ V | F U ∈ 〈〈F A 〉〉 , T V ∈ 〈〈T B 〉〉 }
〈〈F A ⊃ B 〉〉 = {F U ⊃ V | T U ∈ 〈〈T A 〉〉 , F V ∈ 〈〈F B 〉〉 }.
3. 〈〈T nA 〉〉 = {T vn:U | T U ∈ 〈〈T A 〉〉 }.
〈〈F nA 〉〉 = {F t:(U1 ∨ . . . ∨ Uk) | F U1, . . . , F Uk ∈ 〈〈F A 〉〉 and t is any justification term}.
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4. The mapping is extended to sets of signed annotated formulas by letting 〈〈S 〉〉 = ∪{ 〈〈Z 〉〉 | Z ∈
S}.
Definition 5.2.2 (Quasi-Realization) LetA be an annotated modal formula. If F U1, . . . , F Un ∈
〈〈F A 〉〉 , we say the justification formula U1 ∨ . . . ∨ Un is a quasi-realization of A. (Disjunction may
be primitive or defined depending on details of language.)
For a modal formula without annotations, a quasi-realization for it is any quasi-realization for
A′, where A′ is any annotated version of A.
Example 5.2.3 Suppose t, u, and w are justification terms and P and Q are atomic formulas.
Here are some quasi-realization calculations, leading up to F 1(2P ⊃ 3Q). We do not produce
all quasi-realizations; the set would be infinite since there are infinitely many justification terms.
1. {T P} = 〈〈T P 〉〉 and {F Q} = 〈〈F Q 〉〉
2. {T v2:P} = 〈〈T 2P 〉〉
3. {F t:Q,F u:Q} ⊆ 〈〈F 3Q 〉〉
4. {F v2:P ⊃ t:Q,F v2:P ⊃ u:Q} ⊆ 〈〈F 2P ⊃ 3Q 〉〉
5. {F t:((v2:P ⊃ t:Q) ∨ (v2:P ⊃ u:Q)), F w:(v2:P ⊃ u:Q)} ⊆ 〈〈F 1(2P ⊃ 3Q) 〉〉
It follows that t : ((v2 :P ⊃ t :Q) ∨ (v2 :P ⊃ u :Q)) ∨ w : ((v2 :P ⊃ u :Q) is a quasi-realization for
(P ⊃ Q). There are many others.
The idea is that a quasi-realization, as defined above, is a candidate. We want to determine
circumstances under which a provable modal formula has a provable quasi-realization.
5.3 When Quasi-Realizations Exist
We now come to the central theorem of this report. Everything preceding has been leading up to
this. The result is not really new. It is implicit in [9]; we are now making it explicit.
Theorem 5.3.1 Let KL be a normal modal logic characterized by a class of frames FL, and let JL
be an axiomatically formulated justification logic, for which internalization holds. If the canonical
Fitting model (Section 4.4) for JL is based on a frame in FL, then every validity of KL has a
provable quasi-realization in JL.
Once the following Lemma is shown, the Theorem follows easily. The Lemma and its proof
benefit from some notational conventions. For a Fitting model M and an annotated formula X,
M,Γ  〈〈T X 〉〉 means M,Γ  Y for every justification formula Y such that T Y ∈ 〈〈T X 〉〉 , and
M,Γ  〈〈F X 〉〉 means M,Γ 6 Y for every justification formula Y such that F Y ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 .
Lemma 5.3.2 Let M = 〈G,R,V, E〉 be the canonical model for the axiomatically formulated justi-
fication logic JL, a logic with the internalization property. Let N = 〈G,R,V〉 be the corresponding
modal model that is formed by dropping the evidence function from M. Then for every annotated
modal formula X we have the following.
1. M,Γ  〈〈T X 〉〉 =⇒ N ,Γ  X
2. M,Γ  〈〈F X 〉〉 =⇒ N ,Γ 6 X
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Proof By induction on the degree of the annotated modal formula X.
Ground Case Suppose X = A, which is atomic. The only member of 〈〈T A 〉〉 is T A, so M,Γ 
〈〈T A 〉〉 iff M,Γ  A iff Γ ∈ V(A) iff N ,Γ  A. This establishes item 1; item 2 is similar.
Implication Case Suppose X = A ⊃ B and the results are known for A and for B.
1. Assume M,Γ  〈〈T A ⊃ B 〉〉 . We divide the argument into two parts.
Suppose first that M,Γ  〈〈F A 〉〉 . By the induction hypothesis, N ,Γ 6 A, so N ,Γ 
A ⊃ B.
Suppose next that M,Γ 6 〈〈F A 〉〉 . Then for some U with F U ∈ 〈〈F A 〉〉 , M,Γ  U .
Let T V be an arbitrary member of 〈〈T B 〉〉 . Then T U ⊃ V ∈ 〈〈T A ⊃ B 〉〉 so by
the assumption, M,Γ  U ⊃ V , and hence M,Γ  V . Since T V was arbitrary,
M,Γ  〈〈T B 〉〉 . Then by the induction hypothesis, N ,Γ  B and hence N ,Γ  A ⊃ B.
2. Assume M,Γ  〈〈F A ⊃ B 〉〉 . Let T U ∈ 〈〈T A 〉〉 and F V ∈ 〈〈F B 〉〉 both be arbitrary.
Then F U ⊃ V ∈ 〈〈F A ⊃ B 〉〉 so by the assumption, M,Γ 6 U ⊃ V . Then M,Γ  U
and M,Γ 6 V . Since T U and F V were arbitrary, M,Γ  〈〈T A 〉〉 and M,Γ  〈〈F B 〉〉 ,
so by the induction hypothesis, N ,Γ  A and N ,Γ 6 B. Hence N ,Γ 6 A ⊃ B.
Modal Case Suppose X = nA and the results are known for A.
1. Assume M,Γ  〈〈T nA 〉〉 . Let T U ∈ 〈〈T A 〉〉 be arbitrary. By the assumption, M,Γ 
vn:U . Let ∆ ∈ G be arbitrary, with ΓR∆. ThenM,∆  U and, since T U was arbitrary,
M,∆  〈〈T A 〉〉 . By the induction hypothesis, N ,∆  A and, since ∆ was arbitrary,
N ,Γ  nA.
2. Assume M,Γ  〈〈F nA 〉〉 . This case depends on the following Claim. We first show
how the Claim is used, then we prove the Claim itself.
Claim: We use notation from Section 4.4. The set S = Γ]∪{¬U | F U ∈ 〈〈F A 〉〉 }
is consistent in the justification logic JL.
The Claim is used as follows. Since (as we will show) S is consistent in JL, it can be
extended to a maximally consistent set, ∆. Since M is a canonical model, ∆ ∈ G and
ΓR∆ since Γ] ⊆ ∆. Also {¬U | F U ∈ 〈〈F A 〉〉 } ⊆ ∆ so by the Truth Lemma 4.4.1,
M,∆ 6 U for all U with F U ∈ 〈〈F A 〉〉 , and so M,∆  〈〈F A 〉〉 . Then by the induction
hypothesis N ,∆ 6 A, and hence N ,Γ 6 nA. Now to complete things, we establish the
claim itself.
Proof of Claim: Suppose S is not consistent in JL. Then for some G1, . . . , Gm ∈
Γ], and F U1, . . . , F Uk ∈ 〈〈F A 〉〉 , {G1, . . . , Gm,¬U1, . . . ,¬Uk} is not consistent,
and so `JL G1 ⊃ (G2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ (Gm ⊃ (U1 ∨ . . . ∨ Uk)) . . .). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
Gi ∈ Γ], and so there is some justification term gi so that gi :Gi ∈ Γ. Also
since JL has the internalization property, there is some justification term t so
that `JL t:(G1 ⊃ (G2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ (Gm ⊃ (U1 ∨ . . . ∨ Uk)) . . .)). Now repeated use
of the J0 axiom scheme for · yields the following (with the justification term
parenthesized to the left).
`JL g1:G1 ⊃ (g2:G2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ (gm:Gm ⊃ (t · g1 · . . . · gm):(U1 ∨ . . . ∨ Uk)) . . .)
It follows from maximal consistency of Γ that (t ·g1 · . . . ·gm):(U1∨ . . .∨Uk) ∈ Γ,
and hence by the Truth Lemma, M,Γ  (t · g1 · . . . · gm):(U1 ∨ . . . ∨ Uk). But
this contradicts the assumption that M,Γ  〈〈F nA 〉〉 .
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With the proof of the fundamental Lemma 5.3.2 out of the way, we can now establish the main
result.
Proof of Theorem 5.3.1 The proof is by contraposition. Suppose Y is a modal formula. Let X
be an annotated version of Y and suppose that X has no provable quasi-realization in JL. We show
Y is not a validity of KL.
Since X has no provable quasi-realization, for every U1, . . . , Un with F U1, . . . , F Un ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 ,
6`JL U1∨. . .∨Un (Definition 5.2.2). It follows that {¬U | F U ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 } is consistent in JL. (Because
otherwise, {¬U | F U ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 } `JL ⊥, so ¬U1, . . . ,¬Un `JL ⊥ for some F U1, . . . , F Un ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 ,
and hence `JL U1 ∨ . . . ∨ Un, contrary to what has been established.)
Since {¬U | F U ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 } is consistent, it can be extended to a maximal consistent set Γ. In
the canonical modelM, Γ is a possible world. Using the Truth Lemma,M,Γ  〈〈F X 〉〉 , and so by
Lemma 5.3.2, N ,Γ 6 X. A hypothesis of Theorem 5.3.1 is that the canonical justification model
is based on a frame in the class FL, which determines the modal logic KL. We thus have a modal
model N for KL in which X fails, and hence so does Y , the unannotated version of X. Then Y is
not a validity of KL.
5.4 Quasi-Realizations to Realizations
This is an abbreviated section because the work appears in full detail in [13]. Here we merely give
definitions, and state some results.
We define a mapping similar to that in Definition 5.2.1, except for one case, F. We still
assume v1, v2, . . . enumerates all justification variables.
Definition 5.4.1 The mapping [[ · ]] is defined recursively on the set of signed annotated modal
formulas.
1. If A is atomic, [[T A ]] = {T A} and [[F A ]] = {F A}.
2. [[T A ⊃ B ]] = {T U ⊃ V | F U ∈ [[F A ]] , T V ∈ [[T B ]]}
[[F A ⊃ B ]] = {F U ⊃ V | T U ∈ [[T A ]] , F V ∈ [[F B ]]}.
3. [[T nA ]] = {T vn:U | T U ∈ [[T A ]]}.
[[F nA ]] = {F t:U | F U ∈ [[F A ]] and t is any justification term}.
4. The mapping is extended to sets of signed annotated formulas by letting [[S ]] = ∪{ [[Z ]] | Z ∈
S}.
A normal realization of annotated modal X is any justification formula U where F U ∈ [[F X ]] .
More generally, members of [[Z ]] are called realizers of Z, where Z is a T signed or F signed,
annotated modal formula. For a modal formula X without annotations, a normal realization for
X is any normal realization for X ′, where X ′ is an annotated version of X. (This agrees with
Definition 2.4.2, though we omit the proof.)
In [13] an algorithmic proof is given for the following. (The proof was stated specifically for LP,
but nothing special about that logic was used.)
Theorem 5.4.2 If F Q1, . . . , F Qk ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 , then there is a substitution σ (of justification terms
for justification variables), and there is a justification formula X ′ with F X ′ ∈ [[F X ]] so that
`JL (Q1 ∨ . . . ∨Qk)σ ⊃ X ′, where JL is any justification logic having the internalization property.
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This gives immediately gives us the following, continuing Theorem 5.3.1.
Theorem 5.4.3 Let KL be a normal modal logic characterized by a class of frames FL, and let JL
be an axiomatically formulated justification logic, for which internalization holds. If the canonical
model (Section 4.4) for JL is based on a frame in FL, then every validity of KL has a provable
realization in JL, though the constant specification may need enlarging.
Proof Suppose the hypotheses. And suppose X is a validity of KL. By Theorem 5.3.1 there are
F Q1, . . . , F Qk ∈ 〈〈F X 〉〉 so that `JL Q1 ∨ . . . ∨Qk. By Theorem 5.4.2, there is some substitution
σ and some F X ′ ∈ [[F X ]] so that `JL (Q1 ∨ . . . ∨Qk)σ ⊃ X ′. Since we assume justification logics
are axiomatized by schemes, the result of applying a substitution to a theorem is another theorem,
though some additional cases may need to be added to the constant specification. (We do not
discuss this point further here, and suppress explicit mention of the constant specification.) Then
`JL (Q1 ∨ . . . ∨Qk)σ and so `JL X ′, and we have our provable normal realization.
Examples of realization proofs using the results above can be found in the next chapter.
Chapter 6
What Next?
Before discussing the future, we present some examples of justification logics and realization results
that are new to the literature. This shows the present approach can be fruitful, though the work
still has an ad hoc air to it.
6.1 Examples Already Discussed
In Section 3.3 we discussed a modal logic K43 and a justification logic J43. K43 is complete with
respect to frames meeting the condition ΓR3∆ =⇒ ΓR∆. Our discussion continued in Section 4.3.1,
and finally in Section 4.5.1 we showed the canonical model for J43 had a frame meeting the K43
condition. Then by Theorem 5.4.3, there is a realization result connecting J43 and K43.
The more familiar modal logic S4.2 was considered in Section 3.4 along with a justification
logic J4.2. The modal frame conditions are those for S4 together with being convergent. Further
discussion was in Section 4.3.2. Finally in Section 4.5.2 we showed the canonical J4.2 model has
a frame that is convergent. The other S4 conditions are straightforward. Then we again have a
realization result.
6.2 A Few New Examples
The book Modal Logic [5] contains an excellent treatment of Sahlqvist formulas. In Section 3.6
of that book a few simple examples are discussed as Example 3.5.5. While these logics are not of
much intrinsic interest, they will do to illustrate the ideas in this report.
6.2.1 Sahlqvist Example One
The Sahlqvist scheme (X ⊃ ♦X) is shown in [5] to correspond to frame condition ΓR∆ =⇒ ∆R∆.
Justification logics ‘prefer’ the  operator over the ♦ operator, so we will use an equivalent modal
axiom scheme: (X ⊃ X). A guiding principle we have followed in our earlier examples is that
for a justification logic we should make positive  occurrences depend on negative ones. So we
propose the following scheme for a corresponding justification logic, where f is a one-place function
symbol: f(t):(t:X ⊃ X).
It is easy to see that the forgetful functor maps the justification logic into the modal logic in
this case. To show realization we must show the canonical justification model is based on a frame
meeting the given modal frame condition. SupposeM = 〈G,R,V, E〉 is the canonical model for the
justification logic extending J0 with the scheme f(t):(t:X ⊃ X) and an axiomatically appropriate
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constant specification. Assume that for some Γ,∆ ∈ G we have ΓR∆ but not ∆R∆. We derive a
contradiction.
Since we do not have ∆R∆ then ∆] 6⊆ ∆. Then for some justification formulas, t :X ∈ ∆
but X 6∈ ∆. Since ∆ is maximally consistent, t:X ⊃ X 6∈ ∆. Since Γ is maximally consistent,
f(t):(t:X ⊃ X) ∈ Γ. And since ΓR∆, Γ] ⊆ ∆, so t:X ⊃ X ∈ ∆. This is our contradiction, and
realization is established.
6.2.2 Sahlqvist Example Two
In [5] it is shown that the Sahlqvist schema (X ∧ ♦¬X) ⊃ ♦X corresponds to the frame condition
(ΓR∆ ∧ Γ 6= ∆) =⇒ ΓRΓ. Although it is not noted in [5], this reduces to the simpler frame
condition ΓR∆ =⇒ ΓRΓ, and it is this condition that we will use. Also we rewrite the modal
scheme to avoid ♦, obtaining X ⊃ (X ∨ ¬X). Motivated as in Example One, we suggest the
following justification axiom scheme, where g is a one-place function symbol: t:X ⊃ (X ∨ g(t):¬X).
Just as with Example One, the forgetful functor maps the justification logic into the modal
logic. Now supposeM = 〈G,R,V, E〉 is the canonical justification model for the logic extending J0
with the proposed scheme and an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. We show the
frame 〈G,R〉 meets the appropriate condition.
Suppose ΓR∆ but not ΓRΓ; we derive a contradiction. We have Γ] ⊆ ∆ and Γ] 6⊆ Γ. By the
second of these, t:X ∈ Γ but X 6∈ Γ for some t:X. Since Γ is maximally consistent, t:X ⊃ (X ∨ g(t):
¬X) ∈ Γ, and hence (X ∨ g(t):¬X) ∈ Γ. And since X 6∈ Γ, g(t):¬X ∈ Γ. Since Γ] ⊆ ∆, both
X ∈ ∆ and ¬X ∈ ∆, violating consistency.
We have shown that the canonical justification model meets the appropriate frame condition,
and realization follows.
6.3 A Very Concrete Example
We know modal logic S4.2 and justification logic J4.2 correspond. We now give a concrete instance
of a S4.2 theorem, and a corresponding realization. Our proof of realization was not constructive,
but for this example we essentially translate an S4.2 axiomatic proof in its entirety. More will be
said about this at the end.
It is convenient to make use of some special features of justification logics that we haven’t
mentioned before. It simplifies our work here. We assume we have not only an axiomatically
appropriate constant specification, but one that is schematic. This means that the same constant
justifies all instances of an axiom schema. The given proof of Theorem 2.3.1 actually shows that a
justification term t exists that is variable free and justifies X, and if the constant specification is
schematic, it will also justify the result of replacing in X justification variables with more complex
justification terms. We assume this in what follows. We use v1, v2 . . . as justification variables.
Modal formula (6.1) is a theorem of S4.2; it is rewritten without ♦ in (6.2).
[♦A ∧ ♦B] ⊃ ♦(A ∧B) (6.1)
[¬¬A ∧ ¬¬B] ⊃ ¬¬(A ∧B) (6.2)
It is (6.2) that we will realize, but we will maintain the use of ♦ operators, because it makes reading
easier.
Here is a sketch of a proof for (6.1). First, [♦X ∧ ♦Y ] ⊃ ♦♦(X ∧ Y ) is a theorem of K, so
as a special case we have, [♦A ∧ ♦B] ⊃ ♦♦(A ∧ B). Since (A ∧ B) ≡ (A ∧ B), we
then have [♦A ∧ ♦B] ⊃ ♦♦(A ∧ B) in K. In K4 we have ♦♦X ⊃ ♦X, and in particular,
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♦♦(A∧B) ⊃ ♦(A∧B). Consequently we have [♦A∧♦B] ⊃ ♦(A∧B) in K4. Likewise we
have A ⊃ A, and so ♦A ⊃ ♦A. Then [♦A∧♦B] ⊃ ♦(A∧B) is a theorem of K4. In
S4.2 we have ♦X ⊃ ♦X, so in particular, ♦B ⊃ ♦B, and so [♦A∧♦B] ⊃ ♦(A∧B)
is a theorem of S4.2. Finally, using B ⊃ B, we have [♦A∧♦B] ⊃ ♦(A∧B). (We didn’t
use X ⊃ X. This is not important, but it is interesting.) Our proof in J4.2 of a formula that
realizes this will incorporate analogs of each part of the proof just sketched.
We begin with [♦A ∧ ♦B] ⊃ ♦♦(A ∧ B), which is a theorem of K. We produce a
sequence of theorems of J0 with an axiomatically appropriate, schematic constant specification. In
this, j1, j2, and j3 are justification terms supplied by Theorem 2.3.1. Also, references to dist are to
the distributivity axiom scheme, s:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (t:X ⊃ s · t:Y ), generally combined with some simple
propositional manipulation.
A ⊃ (B ⊃ (A ∧B)) tautology
j1:{A ⊃ (B ⊃ (A ∧B))} Theorem 2.3.1
¬[j1 · v1 · v3]:(A ∧B) ⊃ (v1:A ⊃ ¬v3:B) dist.
j2:{¬[j1 · v1 · v3]:(A ∧B) ⊃ (v1:A ⊃ ¬v3:B)} Theorem 2.3.1
v5:¬[j1 · v1 · v3](A ∧B) ⊃ {¬[j2 · v5 · v2]:¬v3:B ⊃ ¬[v2 · v1]:A} dist.
j3:{v5:¬[j1 · v1 · v3](A ∧B) ⊃ {¬[j2 · v5 · v2]:¬v3:B ⊃ ¬[v2 · v1]:A}} Theorem 2.3.1
{¬[j3 · v6 · v4]:¬v2:v1:A ∧ v4:¬[j2 · v5 · v2]:¬v3:B} ⊃ ¬v6:v5:¬[j1 · v1 · v3]:(A ∧B) dist.
We now have that for the two formulas,
[♦A ∧♦B] ⊃ ♦♦(A ∧B) (6.3)
{¬[j3 · v6 · v4]:¬v2:v1:A ∧ v4:¬[j2 · v5 · v2]:¬v3:B} ⊃ ¬v6:v5:¬[j1 · v1 · v3]:(A ∧B) (6.4)
justification formula (6.4) is a provable realization of modal formula (6.3).
Next we realize the K4 theorem ♦♦(A ∧ B) ⊃ ♦(A ∧ B). We have the LP axiom v7 :¬v8 :
(A ∧B) ⊃!v7:v7:¬v8:(A ∧B), so we immediately have the following realizer theorem.
¬!v7:v7:¬v8:(A ∧B) ⊃ ¬v7:¬v8:(A ∧B) (6.5)
To match the antecedent of (6.5) with the consequent of (6.4) we set v6 =!v7, v7 = v5, and
v8 = j1 · v1 · v3. (This is actually a unification problem.) When this is done, and antecedent and
consequent match, they can be ‘cut out’, yielding (6.7) below, which realizes (6.6).
[♦A ∧♦B] ⊃ ♦(A ∧B) (6.6)
{¬[j3·!v5 · v4]:¬v2:v1:A ∧ v4:¬[j2 · v5 · v2]:¬v3:B} ⊃ ¬v5:¬[j1 · v1 · v3]:(A ∧B) (6.7)
The next step is to realize ♦A ⊃ ♦A. We have the LP axiom v9:A ⊃!v9:v9:A. This gives the
theorem ¬!v9:v9:A ⊃ ¬v9:A. Using Theorem 2.3.1, there is a justification term, call it j4, provably
justifying this. Then using distributivity, we get ¬[j4 · v10]:¬v9:A ⊃ ¬v10:¬!v9:v9:A. We match the
consequent of this with the A part of the antecedent of (6.7) by setting v10 = j3·!v5 · v4, v2 =!v9,
and v1 = v9. Then, again cutting out the common antecedent/consequent, we have (6.9), which
realizes (6.8)
{♦A ∧♦B] ⊃ ♦(A ∧B) (6.8)
{¬[j4 · j3·!v5 · v4]:¬v9:A ∧ v4:¬[j2 · v5·!v9]:¬v3:B} ⊃ ¬v5:¬[j1 · v9 · v3]:(A ∧B) (6.9)
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Next we realize ♦B ⊃ ♦B. This, at last, makes use of J4.2 axiom scheme (3.1). By it
we have ¬f(v11, v13):¬v11:v12:B ⊃ g(v11, v13)¬v13:¬v12:B. We match the consequent of this with the
B part of the antecedent of (6.9) by setting v4 = g(v11, v13), v13 = j2 · v5·!v9, and v3 = v12. Then
cutting out common parts, we get (6.11), which realizes (6.10).
[♦A ∧ ♦B] ⊃ ♦(A ∧B) (6.10)
{¬[j4 · j3·!v5 · g(v11, j2 · v5·!v9)]:¬v9:A∧
¬f(v11, j2 · v5·!v9):¬v11:v3:B} ⊃ ¬v5:¬[j1 · v9 · v3]:(A ∧B)
(6.11)
Finally we realize ♦B ⊃ ♦B. Using Theorem 2.3.1, let us say j5 justifies the LP theorem
¬!v3:v3:B ⊃ ¬v3:B. Then using distributivity, we can get ¬[j5 · v14]:¬v3:B ⊃ ¬v14:¬[!v3 · v3]:B. We
match consequent of this with the B part of the antecedent of (6.11) by setting v14 = f(v11, j2·v5·!v9)
and v11 =!v3. Then cutting out the common portion, we finally arrive at the following, in which
(6.13) realizes (6.12) in J4.2.
[♦A ∧ ♦B] ⊃ ♦(A ∧B) (6.12)
{¬[j4 · j3·!v5 · g(!v3, j2 · v5·!v9)]:¬v9:A∧
¬[j5 · f(!v3, j2 · v5·!v9)]:¬v3:B} ⊃ ¬v5:¬[j1 · v9 · v3]:(A ∧B)
(6.13)
Some concluding remarks about this example. The realization was constructed by converting a
modal proof, making use of unification at appropriate places. Not all modal proofs convert in this
way. Ren-June Wang introduced the notion of a non-circular proof (for S4) in [24]. It is these that
can be converted. Further study of this would be interesting.
6.4 Future Work
We have given several new examples of justification logics together with realization theorems,
albeit with non-constructive proofs. But the examples have been rather ad hoc. We have generated
justification logics from modal logics by introducing function terms so that positive modal positions
depend on negative positions. Then we verified that the conditions of Theorem 5.4.3 held by
axiomatic arguments that depended on the details of the particular justification logic. What is the
common thread in all this?
We conjecture that our methods apply to any Sahlqvist logic, and do so for systematic, uni-
form reasons. There is no proof (yet) of our conjecture, but we have some confidence in it. The
treatment of Sahlqvist’s work in [5] is especially nice, and carries it out for multi-modal logics,
involving generalizations of binary accessibility relations. These would be natural generalizations
of justification logic as well. Indeed, the multi-modal case has already been explored to some extent
by a few researchers. This is our proposed direction for future work.
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